The transcendental deduction of ideas in Kant’s critique of pure reason by Ypi, Lea
  
Lea Ypi 
The transcendental deduction of ideas in 
Kant’s critique of pure reason 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 Original citation: Ypi, Lea (2017) The transcendental deduction of ideas in Kant’s critique of pure reason. 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 117 (2). pp. 163-185. ISSN 0066-7374  
DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aox010 
 
© 2018 John Wiley & Son 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/87260/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: March 2018 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
  
1 
Lea Ypi 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
The Transcendental Deduction of Ideas in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 
 
This article explores the problem of the transcendental deduction of ideas in the controversial pages of the 
Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. It suggests that Kant’s difficulties 
with the deduction can be explained in light of a tension between two notions of purposiveness: purposiveness 
as design and purposiveness as normativity.
 
While the latter is shaped by the practical demands of reason, the 
former relies on an argument about the teleological structure of nature. The article further shows that although 
the Critique of Pure Reason tries to ground the unity of reason in a notion of purposiveness as normativity, it 
lacks the resources to do so. The result is a unifying attempt which collapses the demand for unity of reason in a 
demand for the unity of nature and which grounds the unity of nature on a notion of purposiveness as design. 
This outcome challenges not only Kant’s unifying project, but the success of the entire critical enterprise. 
Explaining how it unfolds by considering Kant’s analysis in the first Critique, and in minor writings of the same 
period, provides the most textually accurate account of Kant’s oscillations in the Appendix, whilst also doing 
justice to its future developments.  
 
 
 
            1. Introduction 
 
 One of the most perplexing features of the defence of the unity of reason in the first Critique 
concerns Kant’s treatment of the function of ideas in the Appendix to the Transcendental 
Dialectic. Often read as a precursor to the analysis of the role of reflective judgment in the 
Critique of Judgment, the pages of the Appendix have generated several interpretive 
controversies.
1
 Firstly, there is the controversy about what kind of experience the ideas of 
reason help systematise. On a weaker reading, their role is to support reason in the activity of 
ordering the empirical laws of nature. On a stronger reading, they are essential to the very 
conception of an empirical law, as opposed to a contingent generalisation. Secondly, there is 
the controversy about the presupposition of the systematic unity of nature on which this kind 
of enquiry relies, and about the status of ideas in supporting such presupposition. On a 
weaker reading, the role of ideas is purely methodological. The pure concepts of reason are 
simply useful as heuristic devices required to project a hypothetical unity necessary to render 
coherent the activity of scientific enquiry. On a stronger reading, the kind of unity they 
project is not purely methodological but presupposes a purposive arrangement of nature 
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itself. Thirdly, there is the issue of the principles on which the hypothetical use of ideas 
relies. On the weaker reading, this use rests on logical principles of homogeneity, 
specification and continuity.  On the stronger reading, such principles are themselves 
grounded on a further, transcendental, principle. Finally, there is the controversy about what 
kind of necessity is at stake in this last statement, the statement that logical principles must 
necessarily rest on transcendental grounds.  For some, the necessity in question is of a 
theoretical nature. For others, it is eminently practical. 
 In this article, I try to shed light on these puzzles by exploring yet another, less 
familiar, source of controversy in the Appendix: the problem of the transcendental deduction 
of ideas. I will begin by explaining what the problem of deduction consists in, then revisit 
some of the most common responses to it and illustrate why they miss the mark. Then I will 
turn to an alternative interpretation of the problem of deduction, one that explains Kant’s 
difficulties in light of a tension between two notions of purposiveness: purposiveness as 
design and purposiveness as normativity.
2
 While the latter is shaped by the practical demands 
of reason, the former relies on an argument about the teleological structure of nature. As I 
hope to show, although the Critique of Pure Reason tries to ground the unity of reason in a 
notion of purposiveness as normativity, it lacks the resources to do so. The result is a 
unifying attempt which collapses the demand for unity of reason in a demand for the unity of 
nature and which grounds the unity of nature on a notion of purposiveness as design. This 
outcome challenges not only Kant’s unifying project, but the success of the entire critical 
enterprise. Explaining how it unfolds by considering Kant’s analysis in the first Critique, and 
in minor writings of the same period, provides the most textually accurate account of the 
rationale for Kant’s oscillations in the Appendix, whilst also doing justice to its future 
developments.  
 
 
2. The deduction of transcendental ideas  
 
One cannot avail oneself of a concept a priori”, Kant argues, without having completed a 
“transcendental deduction of it” (KrV, A 669-670, B 697-698; 605).3 Of course, he continues, 
the kind of deduction worthy of the pure concepts of reason is not going to be the same as that 
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 See for the use of the term purposiveness as normativity (Ginsborg, 2015 and Ginsborg, forthcoming). 
3
 Here and in what follows I refer to Kant’s works by using an abbreviation followed by the page number of the 
Prussian Academy edition and the page number of the Cambridge University Press edition. 
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of the categories of the understanding. However, if ideas “are to have the least objective 
validity, even if it is only an indeterminate one, and are not to represent merely empty 
thought-entities (entia rationis ratiocinantis), a deduction of them must definitely be possible” 
(KrV, A 669-670, B 697-698; 605).  
Taken in isolation, such remarks are not at all puzzling. Kant’s appeal to the concept 
of deduction, here as elsewhere, has to do less with the application of inferential reasoning 
from known valid premises to a necessarily valid conclusion, as with the demonstration of the 
legitimacy of a kind of entitlement, the entitlement of reason to deploy its pure concepts in a 
particular way.
4
 As many commentators have noted, Kant’s concept of deduction is indebted 
to the 18
th
 century legal literature and the tradition of “deduction writings”, a body of work 
whose purpose was to prove the legitimacy of certain, contested, territorial acquisition within 
the borders of the Holy Roman Empire. Such lengthy texts were prepared by jurists in the 
event of interrogation by imperial courts and faced the task to prove that certain de facto rulers 
of contested land and resources also had a rightful (de jure) claim to them.
5
 Inspired by this 
idea, Kant provides the enterprise of the philosopher with a similar justificatory spin. Like the 
jurist, the philosopher must provide a detailed factual statement of the territorial claims of 
reason within the boundaries of experience. He must illustrate their function and justify their 
validity. And like the jurist, the philosopher knows that only after such a procedure has been 
completed, can the rulers’ acquisitions in their respective domains be considered secure from 
any possible future incursions by enemies.  
Kant’s use of territorial metaphors to explain the critical activity of pure reason, and 
to discredit the claims of its adversaries is aligned to this interpretation of deduction. The 
advocate of reason must prove to both the sceptic and the dogmatic that the pure concepts of 
reason rule over the field of experience. But they rule legitimately only if they can survive 
scrutiny of their origin, function and validity. Only then will the sceptic and the dogmatic 
discover the “impossibility of having a title for their assertions”, while the critique compels 
pure reason to “renounce its exaggerated pretensions” and “draw back within the boundaries 
of its proper territory” (KrV A 794; B 822; 671).  
The attempt to justify by means of a deduction the positive use of the pure concepts of 
                                                 
4
 For an excellent analysis of the background against which we should understand the term deduction in Kant’s 
writings, see (Henrich, 1989). See also the discussion of Henrich’s position in (Moller, 2013). 
5
 See for a longer discussion of the practice (Henrich, 1989) and (Proops, 2003) 
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reason should be understood in this light. Having illustrated in the first part of the Appendix 
the function of the ideas of reason in the systematic orientation of the empirical use of the 
understanding, Kant’s goal in the second part is to show how that use could be justified. That 
deduction, he argues, ensures “the completion of the critical business of pure reason” (KrV, A 
669-670, B 697-698; 605). 
But the issue is not as straightforward. The division between a first, more descriptive 
account of the positive function of ideas, and a second part, where their claim to validity is 
further scrutinised within the territory of experience does not follow neatly the deduction 
writings’ model that I have just sketched. In the first part of the Appendix, when discussing 
the hypothetical use of the ideas of reason and their heuristic role in guiding the empirical 
investigation of nature, Kant rules out a possible deduction of the principles to which a 
similar way of proceeding leads. This kind of deduction, he insists, “is always impossible in 
regard to ideas” (KrV A 663; B 692; 602).  
Why does Kant first rule out a deduction of ideas, and then proceed to provide it? And 
what exactly does the deduction add to the analysis of the role of ideas in the systematic 
organisation of experience that Kant has previously examined? The scholarship here is 
extremely divided. Until recently, the standard interpretation was to treat Kant’s oscillations as 
symptomatic of the generally confused, even contradictory, character of the treatment of ideas 
in this part of the Critique.
6
 Some authors ignore the problem of deduction altogether, and 
proceed as if only the declarations of its impossibility in the first part of the Appendix were 
authoritative.
7
 Among the more charitable readings, we can distinguish between a weaker and 
a stronger version. On the weaker version, the appearance of a deduction of ideas of reason in 
the second half of the Appendix poses no great interpretative challenges once we understand 
correctly the role of the postulate of nature’s systematicity in orienting the taxonomical 
activities of observers of the natural world. The reason why, on this weaker explanation, the 
deduction is no big deal, is that the idea of systematicity of nature only has a 
heuristic/methodological status with no bearing on the way in which the categories of the 
understanding are applied to create empirical concepts.
8
  The trouble with this interpretation is 
that it solves the problem of deduction only by denying that there was a problem in the first 
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 The best known interpretation is here that of Norman Kemp Smith (see e.g. Kemp Smith 2003, p. 547) who 
famously condemned the “extremely self-contradictory” character of these pages. Remarks along similar lines, 
stressing the “extremely unstable” nature of the ideas also appear in (Bennett, 1974) and (Horstmann, 1989). 
7
 See, for example, (Wartenberg, 1992, p. 245). 
8
 See for a discussion, (Guyer, 2005, p. 28)  
  
5 
place. If the deduction of ideas posed no special difficulties given Kant’s consistent 
methodological commitment to regulativity, why was he initially so concerned to deny that a 
deduction might ever be possible? Presumably, so the answer goes, because there is a stronger 
reading of what Kant was up to when in the second part of the Appendix, he insisted that, upon 
further scrutiny, reason’s heuristic/subjective use had to be grounded on a transcendental 
principle presupposing the conformity to ends of nature itself.  
Proponents of this second, stronger interpretation, have recently tried to link these 
claims to a larger debate about Kant’s defence of the unity of reason and the assertion of the 
supremacy of practical reason.
9
 Kant’s demand for systematicity in nature, so the argument 
goes, is grounded on reason’s practical demand for systematicity. In the most widespread 
interpretation, the claim made is one about reason’s own dynamic: theoretical reason, just 
like practical reason, is guided by maxims which presuppose that the content of their 
prescriptions must also be realisable. The demand for systematicity in nature stems from the 
nature of our reason and is expressive of its unity. But since the demand also takes the form 
of a prescription to follow (or a maxim, in the practical sense), reason ought to presuppose 
the systematicity of nature, if it is to act consistently with itself.
10
 As one author puts it, the 
necessity of the link between the systematicity of reason and the systematicity in nature is 
due to reason’s own dynamic, which demands “both the idea (the totum realitatis) and the 
supposition of its object (the ens realissimum), for its own practical purposes”11.  
Such a reading, linking the demand for systematicity to the assertion of the unity of 
reason, seems to have the advantage of explaining the seemingly contradictory nature of 
Kant’s oscillations between a subjective reading of the role of ideas (limited to the assertion 
of their heuristic methodological properties) and an objective reading (which demands that 
the logical use of reason be grounded on a necessarily transcendental principle of 
purposiveness in nature). Therefore, it has been suggested, just as Kant argues that we must 
assume a morally purposive unity for the sake of our moral ends, we must also assume 
natural purposiveness for the sake of advancing the imperative to seek cognitive unity.63  
 Although resorting to reason’s practical function to solve the problem of the 
transcendental deduction of ideas seems like a promising strategy, the strategy suffers from 
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 See (Neiman, 1994, pp. 89-90), (Grier, 2001 ch.8; Mudd, 2016)  
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 See (Grier, 2001, p. p.286). See also (Mudd, 2016) and (Zuckert, forthcoming) 
11
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several shortcomings. The main one is perhaps that the concept of a categorical imperative or 
of practical necessity is nowhere present in the first Critique. There is of course much talk of 
practical demands, or needs, or even essential ends, of reason, and there are references to the 
interests of reason for the sake of which some kind of systematicity of nature must be 
presupposed. But if practical reason has no autonomous domain of its own and makes no 
practical laws that it imposes on the world, appealing to the later doctrine of the categorical 
imperative or of transcendental  freedom to solve the tensions present in these pages of the 
first Critique is unlikely to help clear the ambiguous status of ideas. The interpretation 
presents precisely the kind of artificial/teleological interpretation that, in another context of 
research, Kant himself would have rejected for placing at the start of a particular process of 
enquiry, that which must be shown to follow from it. Although I believe that proponents of 
the practical reading have a point in emphasising that the practical needs of reason are key to 
understanding the demand for systematicity, a point which is often neglected by those who 
approach the Appendix out of interest for Kant’s contribution to the methodology of scientific 
research, the remedy they offer to explain Kant’s apparent oscillations, is perhaps too easy.  
Firstly, like the weaker readings of the role of ideas mentioned above, the stronger 
interpretations only solve the problem of the inconsistency concerning the deduction of 
transcendental ideas, by pretending that there is none. But if Kant intended to resort to 
reason’s practical use to justify the deduction of transcendental ideas, why did he simply not 
say so? Why did he insist first that a deduction was impossible? The key to the answer, I 
believe, lies in the ambiguous status that the notion of purposiveness in nature retains 
throughout the first Critique, a question that, for all of Kant’s best efforts, this work is unable 
to solve.  Or so I would now like to show. 
 
3. Teleology and system 
To see why both the weaker and the stronger reading of the deduction of transcendental ideas 
miss the mark in seeking to settle Kant’s oscillations in the Appendix, it is important to return 
to the problem of the deduction as a development of the analysis of the hypothetical use of 
reason. Reason’s hypothetical use, as we know, illustrates the necessity of subsuming under a 
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unitary idea of reason the manifold of empirical cognitions. Such a unitary idea reflects a 
problematic universal which cannot be given through experience but must be necessarily 
presupposed if reason is to conform to its natural destination of seeking the maximal unity of 
cognitions. Starting from the logical application of the pure concepts of reason to the 
empirical laws of nature, Kant arrives at the question of the possible foundation of such 
logical function on a transcendental principle, a principle whose characteristics remains for 
the time being unspecified but which we are told has an inherent link to the postulate of 
systematic unity in nature.  
Proponents of the weaker reading of the Appendix tend to brush off the question of the 
justification of this transcendental principle by arguing that it merely complements the 
coherent use of the understanding in the discovery of the empirical laws of nature but has 
nothing to do with helping the understanding contribute to the production of coherent 
knowledge in general.
12
 But this interpretation misses what is at stake in the claim that a 
deduction of transcendental ideas must, after all, be necessary. The target here is precisely the 
transition from a merely hypothetical/regulative function of ideas to their transcendental 
foundation as pre-requisites of coherent experience in general. When Kant argues that the 
systematic unity of nature must be considered “objectively necessary”, we are already beyond 
the merely problematic status conferred to the idea of systematic unity in the more cautious 
parts of the Appendix. Granted, the demand for systematicity that characterises the 
application of the pure concepts of reason, is very different from the idea of systematic unity 
that is required for concepts of the understanding. But if we take seriously Kant’s argument 
about the role of ideas in systematising the knowledge of the understanding, it would seem 
that the universality and necessity of the categories is itself contingent once we move beyond 
the forms of knowledge in general, and examine also the content of the empirical laws of 
nature without a unitary principle. As Kant argues, what is at stake in the transition from a 
logical principle of systematic unity to a transcendental one, is that in the second case we turn 
to the idea that “all possible cognitions of the understanding (including the empirical ones) 
have the unity of reason, and stand under common principles from which they could be 
derived despite their variety” (KrV A 648/B 676; 593). But if the idea of systematic unity of 
nature is grounded on a transcendental principle of reason which also appears to be 
objectively necessary, the role of ideas goes far beyond that of orienting the empirical use of 
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 Some fail to see the presence of a transcendental principle in the Appendix altogether, see (Horstmann, 1989) 
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the understanding towards an ideal of greater unity.  Ideas, in this case have their own 
distinctive form of universality and necessity, a form of universality of course different from 
the universal of the understanding and nevertheless indispensable to the very application of 
its categories to empirical manifestations.  
Many commentators have noted that the function that ideas perform in this case is 
very similar to the role that the transcendental principle of purposiveness performs in the 
Critique of Judgment. But the difference between the two texts is equally revealing. 
13
 As is 
well-known, in the third Critique the transcendental principle of purposiveness is at the basis 
of the capacity for reflective judgement and enables the systematisation of the empirical laws 
of nature “in terms of the sort of unity they would have if an understanding (even if not ours) 
had likewise given them for the sake of our faculty of cognition, in order to make possible a 
system of experience in accordance with particular laws of nature” (KU 180; 67-8). But 
matters seem very different when we compare this account with the analysis of the same 
problem in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. In the third Critique, Kant is far 
from assigning to the idea of a systematic unity of nature a status that might be considered 
objectively valid and necessary. Indeed, Kant often warns us that “we cannot ascribe to the 
products of nature anything like a relation of nature in them to ends, but we can only use this 
concept in order to reflect on the connection of appearances in nature that are given in 
accordance with empirical laws” (KU 180, 68). This is a kind of principle that the capacity of 
judgement adopts as a law for regulating its own use and for reflecting on a particular kind of 
causality, inspired by the kind of causality reflected in the practical use of reason, a causality 
in conformity with ends. Kant therefore deploys a notion of purposiveness as normativity, 
asking what it would be like to judge objects in a certain way and providing a set of criteria 
grounded on an analogy with the way in which our reason operates in the practical domain. 
To judge objects as purposive on this account is tantamount to asking what they would be if 
they had to conform to a certain number of normative properties, to ask how the object is 
meant to be. Notice that on this account, purposiveness is entirely separate from the idea of 
design: we do not need the latter to be able to think about the former.
14
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 The difference between the role of ideas in the Appendix and the principle of purposiveness in the third 
Critique is often missed by interpreters. Philip Kitcher, for example, argues that “a fundamental part of Kant’s 
ideas about the methodology of science […] his conception of empirical laws, is unaffected by these 
architectonic adjustments”. See (Kitcher, 1994, p. 255) Paul Guyer, on the other hand, focuses on the 
disanalogies but mainly in an attempt to highlight the turn to a different analysis of the functioning of the 
understanding in connection to reflective judgment in the third Critique, (Guyer, 2005, ch.1) 
14
 For an excellent analysis of normativity as purposiveness, see (Ginsborg, 2015, chs.10 and 15)  
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Now, in the Critique of Pure Reason, although Kant hints at the same principle, the 
principle of purposiveness, to explain the possibility of reflecting on systematic unity for the 
purpose of rational systematisation, Kant never mentions this principle explicitly. He also 
does not provide a separate deduction of the use of such a principle as a principle necessary 
to reflect on the relation between particular objects of experience. Rather, his analysis is 
limited to an account of the role of the unitary idea of the system at the basis of the 
hypothetical use of reason and linked to the transcendental deduction of the latter. Although 
ideas also refer to a notion of causality in conformity to ends, in their case, unlike the case of 
judgment, the relation to the concept of design is much more difficult to explain. 
 
4. The rights and needs of reason 
Discussing the necessity of systematic unity, it might be useful to read the Appendix in 
connection to Kant’s remarks on the rights and needs of reason in his shorter essay on What 
is orientation in thinking written in 1786. There is, he claims here, something like “the right 
of reason's need, as a subjective ground for presupposing and assuming something which 
reason may not presume to know through objective grounds; and, consequently, for orienting 
itself in thinking” (WhDO, 137; 10). Such a curious right, warrants reasons’ advancement in 
the “immeasurable space of the supersensible which for us is filled with dark night” and is 
grounded on a need “not only to pose the concept of the unlimited as the ground of the 
concepts of all limited beings” but also “goes as far as the presupposition of its existence” 
(WhDo 137-138; 11). Without this, reason would not be able provide satisfactory ground “for 
the contingency of the existence of things in the world, let alone for the purposiveness and 
order which is encountered everywhere in such a wondrous degree” (WhDO 138; 11).  
It is important to reflect on several features of this account. Reason’s right to postulate 
the concept of the unlimited as the ground of all concepts of limited beings is based on its 
unavoidable tendency to reflect on the first causes of things, including all that which is 
contingent. In particular, the order of ends “which is actually present in the world” leads us to 
postulate the existence of such a purposive world, on the basis of a theoretical need to judge 
about the causes of everything contingent (WhDO 139; 12). 
  Interestingly, Kant’s argument here is very similar to the one that is presented in the 
first Critique. In the latter, Kant also argues that we must abstract from all limiting conditions 
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of the idea of the whole so as to make possible the systematic unity of the manifold. It is only 
through this idea of unity that the greatest possible empirical use of reason is guaranteed and 
all combinations are seen “as if they were ordained by a highest reason of which our reason is 
only a weak copy” (KrV, A 678, B 706; 609). When we refer to such a being, Kant clarifies, 
we refer to nothing else but “the rational concept of God” (KrV, A 685, B 713; 613). 
It is again worth noting that here Kant’s theoretical effort is very different from that 
which we find in the third Critique. Instead of explaining how reason can autonomously 
conceive of the purposive connection of all things given its own standard of how things ought 
to be (purposiveness as normativity), Kant helps himself to the transcendental deduction of 
ideas to strengthen the link between conformity to ends and the idea of a supreme reason that 
is at their basis (purposiveness as design). As Kant argues in the Appendix, if “one cannot 
presuppose purposiveness in nature a priori, i.e., as belonging to the essence of nature (zum 
Wesen derselben gehörig), then how can one be assigned to seek it out following the ladder 
of purposiveness, to approach the highest perfection an author of nature as a perfection which 
is absolutely necessary, hence cognizable a priori? The principle of conformity to ends 
demands here that the “systematic unity be presupposed absolutely as a unity of nature” that 
is recognized “as following from the essence of things” (als aus dem Wesen der Dinge 
folgend) (KrV, A 693, B 721; 617). 
Now, when the Critique of Judgment turns to the topic of the unity of reason and its 
demand for systematicity, it provides an argument that is radically different from the one we 
have just analysed. We cannot “ascribe to the products of nature anything like a relation of 
nature in them to ends”. We can only “use this concept in order to reflect on the connection 
of appearances in accordance with empirical laws”, Kant argues (KU, 181; 68). The rationale 
for the link is given by the analogy between human understanding and reason’s practical 
capacity to pose ends in the world, and it is this capacity for posing normative ends that links, 
as a next step, to the idea of supreme intelligence as the ground and cause of the universe. 
And yet, Kant cautions us that “even if we were capable of having an empirical overview of 
the whole system as long as it concerns mere nature”, this could never “elevate us beyond 
nature to the end of its existence itself, and thereby to the determinate concept of that higher 
intelligence” (KU, 438; 305).  
On the other hand, in the Critique of Pure Reason, the concept of purposiveness does 
not precede but rather follow the postulate of an idea of reason as the fundamental ground of 
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the purposiveness of nature. The deduction of its validity is therefore completely inverted. 
Here too Kant argues that “the greatest systematic unity” and therefore also “purposive unity” 
is “the school and even the ground of the possibility of the greatest use of human reason”. 
And here too he suggests that since this idea of systematic unity is “inseparably bound up 
with the essence of our reason” it is also “legislative for us”, and thus “it is very natural to 
assume a corresponding legislative reason (intellectus archetypus) from which all systematic 
unity of nature, as the object of our reason, is to be derived” (KrV, A 695, B 723; 618). But 
what is the evidence for these claims? One would be tempted to argue on the basis of the 
practical legislation of reason which gives us ends that we ought to pursue. But how would 
that be further justified? In the first Critique there is nothing to suggest that practical reason 
is normative, in the sense that is required to come up with a concept of purposiveness as 
normativity distinguished by purposiveness and design. And it is precisely the absence of 
such concept which opens a gap in Kant’s reasoning, a gap that can only be fully exposed if 
we continue to explore the discontinuities between the perspective of the first and the third 
Critique when it comes to the assumption of systematic unity in nature and its relation to the 
rational idea of God. 
In the third Critique, the apparent purposiveness of all things natural, however far we 
seek to extend it, can never ground a physicotheology: “we will seek in vain to find anything 
that justifies us in the principles of the theoretical use of reason, which always demands that 
no properties be assumed in the explanation of an object of experience that are not to be 
found among the empirical data for its possibility” (KU 438; 305). What we find rather is that 
“there actually lies in us a priori an idea of a highest being, resting on a very different use of 
reason (its practical use), which drives us to amplify physical teleology’s defective 
representation of the original ground of the ends of nature into the concept of a deity” (KU 
438; 305). In the first Critique, instead, Kant argues that if we ask “whether there is anything 
different from the world which contains the ground of the world order and its connection 
according to universal laws, then the answer is: Without a doubt” KrV, A 696, B 724; 619). 
Of course, here too Kant insists that the concept of this being cannot be given by applying 
categories of the understanding to given intuitions but can only be arrived at only “in 
accordance with the analogy with an intelligence”, in a way similar to Aquinas and Leibniz. 
The concept of an analogia entis enables reason to conceive of God as an object in the idea 
and therefore as “a substratum, unknown to us, of the systematic and purposiveness of the 
world's arrangement, which reason has to make into a regulative principle of its investigation 
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of nature” (KrV, A 696-697, B 724-725; 619).  
Kant of course attempts several clarifications of how to understand all this. The idea 
of the highest intelligence, he argues, does not refer to “a being different from the world” but 
rather to the “regulative principle of the world's systematic unity, but only by means of a 
schema of that unity, namely of a supreme intelligence that is its author through wise 
intentions”. But if we wonder whether we can nevertheless “assume a unique wise and all-
powerful world author” the answer is: “Without any doubt”. Not just that “but we must 
presuppose such a being”. “But wouldn’t this bring us to expand our cognitions beyond 
possible experience?” The answer is: “By no means” (KrV, A 697, B 725; 619).  
It is not difficult to see how these pages are fraught with tension, a tension that brings 
Kant to constantly oscillate between the imperative to avoid all arbitrariness on the part of 
reason and to keep a firm link with the categories of the understanding and the other, equally 
strong, imperative to pursue its autonomous drive to recognise the validity of its own ideas, 
without which all systematic presupposition would collapse. But this leads us straight to 
reasons’ unavoidable tendency to always seek that which overcomes its limits. Reason can 
recognise its own limit and in doing so it can recognise the drive to step beyond such limit. 
But what is the price of doing so? Kant is very concerned by this problem, the problem of 
avoiding both a kind of fatalistic determinism and the position of a God ruler of the world 
that, in being known by free humans, would end up paralysing their ends. And yet the 
systematic presupposition of systematicity contains also an umediated passage to the 
necessity of positing a ground for its cause. Kant’s reasoning is ad absurdum: the order and 
harmony of thought must reflect the order and harmony of the universe. How else could we 
explain the perception of structures that display a conformity to ends for us but have no end 
as such? The coherence of reason demands a coherent structure of the universe and we can 
only make sense of this coherent structure with reference to the idea of an intelligent being at 
the source of it.  As Kant puts it, all this can only ultimately be explained with reference to 
the idea of a being as “self-sufficient reason which is the cause of the world-whole through 
ideas of the greatest harmony and unity” (KrV, A 678, B 706; 609). 
At points, Kant seeks to resolve this tension by distinguishing between having 
satisfactory reason for assuming something relatively (suppositio relativa) and being 
warranted in assuming it absolutely (suppositio absoluta), arguing that the former does not 
necessarily lead to the latter (KrV, A 676, B 704; 608). But such a solution makes him 
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collapse into each other two separate arguments. One is an argument that nature as such has a 
purpose. The other is an argument that God has ordered nature in a purposeful way. The 
conclusion then is that it must be the same whether someone argues that “the divine has 
ordered everything to its supreme ends, or the idea of the highest wisdom is a regulative one 
in the investigation of nature and a principle of the systematic and purposive unity thereof in 
accordance with universal laws, even where we are not aware of it”. Relatedly, it must be the 
same to argue, on the face of apparent purposive unity "God has wisely willed it so" or 
"Nature has wisely so ordered it." (KrV, A 699, B 727; 620).  
Therefore, even with these cautious statements, the Appendix to the Transcendental 
Dialectic does little other than embedding physical teleology and physical theology within 
the same systematic project. The greatest systematic and purposive unity, on which all 
investigation of nature rests, is grounded on “the idea of a highest intelligence” as “a schema 
of the regulative principle” and “however much purposiveness you encounter in the world in 
accordance with that principle, so much confirmation do you have for the rightness of your 
idea” (KrV, A 699, B 727; 620). The prohibition only concerns the ability to conceive of the 
conformity to ends as contingent and hyperphysical in its origin, thus contradicting the 
fundamental laws of nature.  
 
      5. The advantages and limitations of physical theology  
 
Kant does not explain in great detail what drives reason to want to find a point of transition 
from physical teleology to physical theology, from the purposiveness of nature to the idea of 
God. It is clearly difficult to affirm a positive link between the two but it seems equally hard 
to deny the possibility of this transition. Kant struggles to find a stable perspective from 
which to develop a coherent answer to this problem. The reasons for this difficulty are 
several. Firstly, there is the problem of the obscure dual status of ideas, a status that is not 
merely theoretical but not yet clearly practical. Secondly, there is the problem of having 
failed to develop a proper deduction of an autonomous transcendental principle of 
purposiveness, anchoring its justification to the transcendental deduction of ideas. Finally, 
there is the problem of the demand for architectonic unity which requires a schema of the 
idea of a highest understanding and will. Yet how such a schema is supposed to operate 
within the structure of human faculties has never been clarified. 
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The difficulty appears even greater if we reflect about what the deduction of ideas in 
the Appendix tries to accomplish in the light of the dialectic of human reason. From a merely 
speculative perspective, the final aim of the natural dialectic of human reason consists in 
directing all of its cognitions toward a systematic unitary point, conceived of as a unity that is 
oriented to ends and for whose understanding it is crucial to make reference to a supreme 
understanding, conceived as the author of order and systematic coherence in the world. Kant 
ascribes to the idea of this being, or the rational concept of God, a necessarily regulative 
status, required to ground the hypothetical use of reason (which is in turn necessary to the 
heuristic role played by its ideas).
15
 Reason however is not authorised to infer from the 
subjective presupposition of this concept, an objective proof of its existence. And yet, this is 
precisely what the physico-theological proof of God’s existence seeks to accomplish. The 
proof tries to see “whether a determinate experience, of the things in the present their 
constitution and order, yields a ground of proof that would help us to acquire a certain 
conviction of the existence of the highest being” (KrV, A 620, B 648; 578)16.  
  Kant never concealed his preference for this argument compared to the other 
arguments in favour of the existence of God. According to him, the argument is accessible 
even to the most common human reason, it rests on empirical grounds and has the virtue of 
being “popular and appealing” where the ontological and cosmological proof are “dry and 
abstract”. (PR, 25; 36). In a similar way, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that 
“the world discloses to us such an immeasurable showplace of manifoldness, order, 
purposiveness, and beauty”, a chain of “effects and causes, of ends and means, regularity in 
coming to be and in perishing” that “the entire whole would have to sink into abyss if one 
did not assume something subsisting for itself and independently outside this infinite 
contingency, which supports it and at the same time, as the cause of its existence, secures its 
continuation” (KrV, A 622, B 650; 579). 
But even though Kant emphatically argues that the physico-theological proof always 
“deserves to be named with respect” (KrV, A 623, B 651, 395), when the Critique turns to the 
question of whether the argument is a valid one, his approval seems to waver. This is because 
even if the proof follows the path of experience for most of the argumentative process, it then 
tends to abandon it in favour of the notion of a necessary being. Recall that the analysis starts 
by assuming the existence of such a being only hypothetically, and as a way of strengthening 
                                                 
15
 For more on the relevance of the idea of God in Kant’s theoretical philosophy, see (Andersen, 1983). 
16
 For similar definitions of physical theology see also (Bew., 118; 161-162) (PR, 13; 109, 18; 113, 25; 118, 
136;194), (KU 436;559). 
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our analysis of contingent manifestations of experiences. And yet the proof eventually claims 
to achieve more than that, it seeks to justify the concept of absolute necessity of a first cause. 
In this way, the physico-theological proof ends up providing a definition of the predicates of 
what was supposed to remain abstract and indeterminate from a theoretical perspective. 
Reason ventures itself into the field of what cannot be exhibited and seeks to overcome the 
limits of experience. The physico-theological proof, Kant explains, could at most prove the 
existence of a “highest architect of the world” but hardly that of its “creator” (KrV, A 627/B 
655; 581). If we try to extend the predicates of the highest being to the whole of creation and 
we seek to determine the supreme cause of the world, then we would also need to invoke the 
cosmological and ontological proofs thereby appealing to what we initially sought to avoid. 
  There is also another reason for why Kant warns us of the danger of taking as 
constitutive the principle grounding the systematic unity a nature, a reason that contrasts with 
the ones already mentioned and that is linked to the way in which reason seeks to achieve its 
“destination” from a theoretical perspective. On the one hand, the idea of reason that reflects 
the maximal unity of natural products, as a unity arranged according to highest ends, has a 
certain objective, although indeterminate value. The idea of this unity is an absolutely 
necessary heuristic concept, needed to guide the understanding in the field of contingent 
experience and explore the constitution and connection of objects in it (KrV, A 671, B 699; 
422). On the other hand, if reason neglects the regulative value of this principle and gives it 
content independently from experience, reason not only derives no benefits for its enquiry 
but, as a matter of fact, betrays itself. It presupposes hypostatically, and as a cause, that which 
it must establish as a result of its empirical investigations and only by way of approximation. 
The rational concept of God takes the form of a highest intelligence which is determined 
“anthropomorphically”. In so doing reason “imposes ends on nature forcibly and 
dictatorially, instead of seeking for them reasonably on the path of physical investigation”. 
Notice, that the problem posed here by anthropomorphism is not so much that a concept of 
the highest intelligence is unthinkable. It is rather than what ought to be shown on the basis 
of empirical evidence is established in advance and limited in its reach. Therefore “teleology 
which ought to serve only to supplement the unity of nature in accordance with universal 
laws, not only works to do away with it, but even deprives reason of its end” (KrV, A 693/B 
720; 617). 
  Does that mean that the deduction of transcendental ideas is ultimately bound to fail? 
It is worth insisting that the problem we have highlighted is not so much that Kant entirely 
abandons the attempt to reflect on the existence of God in connection with the enquiry of the 
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empirical laws of nature. It is rather that a kind of purposiveness understood as external 
conformity to ends would condemn physico-theology to a complete failure, bringing reason 
to abuse its own heuristic principles. Instead of explaining the causes of beings that show 
themselves as ends of nature on the basis of “universal laws of the mechanism of matter”, one 
appeals here to “the inscrutable decree of the highest wisdom” regarding the “toil of wisdom 
as completed”. Reason is dispensed without a guarantee of its systematic use, “a use which 
finds its guiding thread nowhere unless it is provided to us the order of nature and the series 
of alterations according to their internal and more general laws” (KrV, A 691, B 719; 616).  
  This version of purposiveness attacked by Kant (and later Hegel), and which admires 
the ends of nature wherever they appear with some (no matter how much) plausibility, was 
celebrated by many contemporaries of Kant, inspired by the Wolffian interpretation of 
Leibniz’s theodicy. As Ernst Cassirer has acutely observed, by the time of Kant’s writing, the 
identification of the idea of purposefulness with that of usefulness had reduced the important 
metaphysical idea of theodicy to a pedantic and trivial academic exercise which tried to 
identify in every aspect of the cosmic order the benefit to humans and thus the wisdom and 
goodness of the creator. Although Kant was attracted to the physico-theological proof of the 
existence of God from early on, contrary to many of his contemporaries, he was also aware of 
its limitations. Already in an early 1763 essay on The only possible argument in support of a 
demonstration of the existence of God, his position appears to be relatively independent. Kant 
constantly warns against those theorists that tend to invoke teleological foundations and the 
will of the creator every time there is a gap in their knowledge. Indeed, he invites his 
contemporaries to avoid incurring into Voltaire’s legitimate mockery when he asks: “Why do 
we have noses’? And then replies: ‘No doubt so that we can wear spectacles’” (Bew., 131; 
172).  
Although in this text Kant does not distinguish clearly between universal and 
particular laws of experience,
 
the rules of the method prescribed by physical theology bear a 
striking resemblance to some of the solutions outlined in the Appendix to the Transcendental 
Dialectic of the first Critique. In this earlier text too, Kant suggests that it is more prudent to 
abstain from considering every benefit that nature offers as the product of a wise architect of 
the world, prioritising instead the study of its mechanical laws. He further argues that 
although attention to the benefits and harmony of nature may contain the spirit of true 
philosophy, it should not hinder the search for universal and necessary laws, it should pay 
special attention to preserving their unity and it should avoid multiplying their causes 
unnecessarily (Bew., 136-137; 177). Thus, although the physico-theological method should 
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be commended for linking the idea of a benevolent legislator to the observation of 
purposiveness in nature, it is not immune from problems. Even if natural causes harmonise 
with a wise choice, it does not follow that “it has been especially instituted by an artificial 
provision” (Bew., 121-122; 163). The harm done to the proof is in this case greater than the 
benefits that are brought to it. This is because every harmony that was once considered 
contingent and is subsequently linked to the universal laws of experience exposes physico-
theology to dangerous objections, rendering its validity ever more restricted. Therefore, if we 
infer a supreme cause of nature from the mere observation of harmony in it:  
 
Humiliated reason distances itself from any further investigation, for it regards such investigation here as prying 
curiosity. And the prejudice is all the more dangerous for furnishing the lazy with the advantage over the tireless 
enquirer; it does so under the pretext of piety and of just subjection to the great Author, in knowledge of whom 
all wisdom must be united. (Bew., 119; 161).  
 
We can already find here the question emphasised in the Critique of Pure Reason in 
relation to the idea of ascribing constitutive validity to the idea of a supreme being. It is the 
problem of what Cicero used to refer to by the term of ignava ratio and which, as Kant 
emphasises, brings reason to neglect all ends internal to life, considering its search already 
concluded when traces of such intelligent design claim to have been identified. Lazy reason, 
Kant argues also in the lectures on the philosophy of religion, is the one that prefers to be 
exonerated from the investigation of whether natural effects might be produced by natural 
causes (PR, 138; 207).  
Notice however, that in the Critique of Pure Reason this very mistake is avoided by 
suggesting to consider from the point of view of purposes not merely a few parts of nature 
but the universal link between the systematic unity of nature and the idea of a highest 
intelligence (KrV, A 691, B 719; 616).  This means that purposiveness in accordance with the 
universal laws of nature can become “the ground, from which no particular arrangement is 
excepted, but arrangements are designated only in a way that is more or less discernible by 
us”. Then, Kant argues, we will have “a regulative principle of the systematic unity of a 
teleological connection (teleologischen Verknüpfung)”. But it is a principle which we do not 
determine beforehand, but may only expect while pursuing the physical-mechanical 
connection according to universal laws” (KrV, A 691-692, B 719-720; 616). From the 
regulative use of the ideas of reason we are taken to the transcendental principle of 
systematicity in nature, and from the transcendental principle of systematicity in nature to a 
critical version of Leibnizean theodicy. 
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Conclusion 
Kant’s oscillations concerning the transcendental deduction of ideas reflect a complex 
relation between the logical and transcendental principle for the systematic unity of nature, a 
link that the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic continuously problematizes without 
ever being able to solve. The source of the problem remains the relation between teleology 
and physico-theology, between natural purposiveness and intelligent design. Although Kant’s 
thoughts on this matter significantly evolved from the time of his pre-critical writings, the 
evolution is not as stark as one might be initially inclined to think. The reasons for the 
difficulty lie in the ambiguous status of transcendental ideas, a status which seems to 
continue oscillating between the mere hypothetical acceptance of their validity, which 
requires some kind of faith in an unspecified being schematised through the ideas of reason, 
and the necessity of such faith coupled with the need to recognise it as more than a mere a 
being in thought. This, as we saw in the previous pages, is what reason demands and needs. 
The nature of the need is grounded in an interest of reason which is difficult to reduce to an 
interest of a speculative-theoretical nature, and has also an important practical dimension. But 
how the realm of the practical is supposed to work in the Appendix is not at all clear, nor is it 
easy to infer on the basis of what Kant says anywhere in the Doctrine of Elements. We have 
not really solved the question, but at least we have clarified the stakes in why Kant himself 
was unable to address it.  
I began this article with a puzzle about the transcendental deduction of ideas and with 
an attempt to question some of the most common interpretations of these pages. Without 
siding completely with authors who rest content with a declaration of the self-contradictory 
nature of Kant’s argument, I also sought to illustrate the weakness of those readings who try 
to explain away the problem by emphasising either the purely hypothetical character of ideas, 
or the practical nature of the enterprise. My interpretation is grounded on an effort to show 
the relevance of transcendental theology for Kant’s attempts to defend the unity of reason. 
The demand for unity is both theoretical and practical but to complete the transition from one 
domain to the other Kant needs a transcendental principle of purposiveness whose status in 
the first Critique is very difficult to disentangle from an analysis of purposiveness as design. 
To deliver on his promise of a deduction, Kant needs to link natural purposiveness to 
physico-theology. But to admit the fundamental relevance of the latter to the unifying project 
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of reason is to endanger the whole critical enterprise. Although Kant does not mention 
physico-theology directly in the pages of the Appendix, if we connect his remarks here with 
his lectures on the philosophy of religion and other relevant essays before and after the so-
called critical turn, we can easily see how the issue of physico-theology is constantly in the 
background of the relation between the systematic unity of nature and the idea of a supreme 
intelligence of the universe.
17
 It is here as a reminder that the only conception of 
purposiveness that is available to Kant at this point of his writings is that of purposiveness as 
design. This is also one of the most important, and most often neglected elements marking a 
difference between the concept of purposiveness that we find in the first Critique and that 
which we find in the third.  The third Critique has a much clearer conception of 
purposiveness as normativity because it is clearly rooted to a conception of practical reason 
where the constitutive practical nature of ideas is unambiguous, and where the practical use 
of reason is much more sharply distinguished from the speculative use of reason. Although 
the first Critique gives some vague indications concerning the practical demands and needs 
of reason, it does not show us a clear path on how to respond to such needs. The failed 
attempt to provide a persuasive transcendental deduction of ideas deserves much more 
scrutiny than we have been prepared to give it. It is one of the most interesting angles from 
which to explore the paths not taken in the first Critique, and to shed light on what needs to 
be there for the unifying teleological project of reason to succeed. But it is far from being an 
unproblematic attempt, or one that we can brush off by prematurely invoking Kant’s practical 
turn. 
 
Abbreviations of Kant’s works: 
Bew   Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, Ak 2  
(1763), translated as The only possible argument in support of a demonstration of  
the existence of God  
KrV     Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781, 1787), translated as Critique of Pure Reason   
KU    Kritik der Urteilskraft, Ak 5 (1790) translated as Critique of the Power of Judgement  
WhDO  Was heisst: sich im Denken orientieren? Ak 8 (1786) translated as What does it mean 
                                                 
17
 It is interesting to see how even those few authors who are aware of the centrality of the idea of god in the 
Appendix miss the connection with the problem of physico-theology, see for one example (McLaughlin, 2014). 
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to orient oneself in thinking? 
PR Vorlesungen über die philosophische Religionslehre, Ak. 28 translated as Lectures on 
Philosophical Theology, trans. by Allen Wood and Gertrude Clark (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1978) 
 
All other translations follow those in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, 
eds. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York: Cambridge University Press 1992-) 
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